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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
The raising of the minimum school leaving age in England and Wales in 1973 has previously been used to estimate the economic returns to an additional year of education. However, this policy change had two effects on members of the affected cohorts: it increased their length of schooling and also increased the probability that they attained at least some academic qualifications.
Another school leaving rule that was in place at the time allows us to isolate the effect of having some academic qualifications versus having none on the outcomes of individuals with the same length of schooling.
This latter exercise suggests that there is a sizeable return to having academic qualifications, increasing the probability of employment by 40 percentage points. This is more than 70% of the estimated return to qualifications based on the raising of the minimum school leaving age -implying that the majority of the policy effect came through the impact on qualifications, with a smaller additional effect due to schooling length.
This has implications for plans to further raise the education leaving age, suggesting that returns will be higher if students are compelled to take nationally recognised exams at the end of their final year of education. Thus raising the minimum school leaving age to 18 -when A-levels and equivalent exams are taken -should have a much greater effect on outcomes than raising the minimum leaving age to 17, an age at which traditionally there are not nationally recognised exams taken.
Introduction
It is well known that identifying the causal effect of education on labour market and other outcomes is problematic given the endogeneity of schooling choice. Changes in compulsory schooling laws, which occurred in the UK in 1947 (when the school leaving age changed from 14 to 15) and 1973 (when it increased again to 16), are natural candidates for instruments and have been widely exploited (see Harmon and Walker, 1995 , Devereux and Hart, 2010 , Grenet, 2009 , for earnings effects and Silles, 2009, Clark and Royer, 2010 , for effects on health outcomes). Typically, estimates focus on the returns to the length of schooling. However, raising the school leaving age, particularly from 15 to 16, affected not only years' education but also the qualifications that people obtained. The extent to which the estimated returns reflect the benefit of an increase in length of schooling, or the returns to gaining specific qualifications is unclear. Yet this is crucially important to policy-makers. For example, the school leaving age is planned to increase again in the UK from 16 to 17 in 2013.The issue is whether this will raise employment and wages among those affected when the high stakes exams are typically taken at age 18.
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the issue of what drives returns to increased education -
whether there is a benefit to increased years of schooling or whether it is qualifications that are key.
To do this, we exploit another institutional rule -the Easter Leaving Rule (ELR) -that determined exactly when in the school year people could leave school. Rather than being allowed to leave on the day of reaching the minimum age, children faced one of two possible leaving dates -the end of the Easter term or the end of the summer term -depending on their birthday. Specifically, those born between 1 st September -31 st January could leave at Easter while those born between 1 st February -31 st August had to stay until the end of the summer, exam-taking term. After the school leaving age rose to 16, the age at which high stakes exams are typically taken in the UK, late leavers were significantly more likely to obtain academic qualifications. We exploit this discontinuity to identify the effect of qualifications on later outcomes, focusing on employment and participation in the labour market. We then compare the unbiased estimates of the effect of qualifications using the ELR as an instrument with the potentially biased estimates of the effect of qualifications using the 1973 Raising of the School Leaving Age (RoSLA) as an instrument. This allows us to say something about whether what matters is qualifications or years of schooling.
The plan of the paper is as follows: the next section discusses related literature on estimating returns to education using RoSLA as well as studies that have attempted to estimate the returns to qualifications directly. Section 3 discusses the institutional rules, and our empirical strategy, in more detail. Section 4 describes the data, while section 5 presents the main regression results. Section 6 concludes.
Related literature
Our paper is related to two existing literatures. First, a number of papers estimate the returns to education by exploiting changes in the school leaving age in the UK. The majority employ variants of the traditional Mincer human capital earnings function in which education is measured in terms of completed years of schooling. Very few of these studies explicitly consider the extent to which the increase in qualifications matters. There is a second literature that does focus on quantifying the returns to specific qualifications or equivalent levels, especially in the UK context. We briefly discuss both in turn. Harmon and Walker (1995) were the first to exploit changes in the minimum school leaving age in the UK to identify the causal effect of increased education on wages. They exploited the 1947 increase from age 14 to 15, affecting school cohorts from 1933 onwards, and the 1973 increase from 15 to 16, affecting cohorts born from 1 st September 1957 onwards, to derive instrumental variables estimates of the return to years' schooling. They estimated a large positive return of 15.3 per cent, but since they did not control for cohort effects, this estimate may be upward-biased, capturing the effect of increasing education among successive cohorts and conflating the actual return to one single additional year of education. A second potential concern is that the estimates derived from school leaving age reforms provide a local average treatment effect (LATE) that may be limited to the specific group of compliers, making interpretation of the Harmon and Walker estimate potentially problematic since it combines the effects of two leaving rule changes.
In order to sharpen the estimate of the wage return to the additional education induced by the 1947 increase in the minimum school leaving age, Devereux and Hart (2010) employ a regression discontinuity design allowing comparison of wages for the cohorts born just before and just after the law change. Using data from the General Household Survey (GHS), Devereux and Hart estimate a return to education for men of approximately 6 per cent for weekly earnings. Using the larger and more accurate New Earnings Survey Panel Data-set (NESPD), the corresponding estimates are between 3-4 per cent in both cases. The combination of the vast dataset (in excess of 1 million observations in the samples using the NESPD) and the identification exploiting a clear and sizeable discontinuity in schooling allows us to be confident that the wage return to education for those induced to gain additional schooling by the 1947 RoSLA is in fact limited to 3-4 per cent.
Focusing on the 1973 change, Grenet (2009) 
Empirical Strategy
In order to disentangle the effect of an additional year of schooling from the effect of credentials gained in school, we exploit a former institutional rule in England and Wales that determined exactly when individuals could leave school -the Easter Leaving Rule.
Since the Education Act of 1870 a September 1 st cut-off has determined which school cohort a child belongs to in England and Wales: thus school cohort t comprises all children born between 1 st September in year t and 31 st August in year t+1. The same Act also established that children are legally bound to attend school from the start of the first academic term following their fifth birthday.
For almost all children, this practically meant starting school at the start of the academic term -and in most cases the academic year -in which they turn five. This means that those born in later months of a school year (June, July, August) will be barely older than four when they begin school in the September and younger in absolute age when each set of exams is taken since exams are taken at a set point within the year, not at a specific age of pupil. This leads to a "summer-born penalty" (see Crawford et al, 2010) and controlling for within-cohort age is therefore important in our analysis below. However, crucially for our analysis, there is no 31 st January cut-off for determining when children start school. However, more significant is the fact that "high stakes" exams are taken in the summer term. For the cohorts we look at, these exams included the General Certificate of Education Ordinary level (GCE This is known as the Easter Leaving Rule (ELR). The discontinuity at 31 st January in school leaving date within a school cohort implies a slightly longer duration of schooling for the younger-born within the school year: depending on when Easter falls the increased education duration implied by the rule is between 33 and 61 days -of which 24 to 44 would be school days.
2 In practice, school start dates vary by local authority with some operating a dual start date (September and January) and others a single, September start date. Ideally, we would have this information but our dataset does not have any information on where respondents were educated.
3 The Education-School Leaving Act 1976 made the "May" school leaving date explicit as the Friday before the last Monday in May -see Del Bono and Galindo-Rueda (2004) O-level) exams, taken by secondary school students who were more academically oriented and the Certificate of Secondary Education (CSE) exams, taken by less academically inclined students. Both O-level and CSE exams were taken by most students at age 16, despite the latter being introduced (in 1965) when the minimum leaving age was still 15. And, for both exams, the exam-taking period was
May-June. As we show below, the requirement for individuals born between 1 st February and 31 st August to remain in school until the end of the exam-taking term increased the likelihood that they took the exams and gained some academic qualification before leaving school, particularly when the minimum school leaving age was 16.
School children born either side of the 31 st January/1 st February discontinuity are in the same school cohort, begin school at approximately the same age and are approximately the same level of maturity within cohort. This discontinuity does not align with any other institutional factor that could affect educational attainment and undermine the identification strategy. It is therefore credible that children born either side of the discontinuity point at 31 st January/1 st February are identical with respect to their unobserved characteristics, such that any difference in their educational attainment is driven solely by the institutional rules governing when they are allowed to leave. We would argue that the difference in the length of schooling between children each side of this cut-off is negligible (approximately 30 days). Instead, the main effect of the leaving rule is on the probability of obtaining academic qualification, particularly for cohorts born after the raising of the school leaving age (RoSLA) from 15 to 16. We would therefore argue that this discontinuity can be exploited to identify the effect of qualifications.
We are not the first to adopt this identification strategy. Anderberg and Zhu (2010) use it to estimate the effect for women of holding academic qualifications on the probability of being married and on the probability of the husband holding qualifications and being economically active. Closer to our study, Del Galindo-Rueda (2004, 2006) Del Bono and Galindo-Rueda explicitly focus on cohorts born after the 1973 reform in order to abstract from the effects of raising the school leaving age. In contrast, our focus is on the cohorts immediately before and after the reform. Our main aim is to shed light on whether the main driver of the returns for the post-RoSLA cohort was the increase in the length of schooling or the increase in qualifications. We do this by comparing the estimated returns to qualifications (exploiting the ELR for the post-RoSLA cohorts) with the estimated effect of the RoSLA itself, which affected both length of schooling and qualifications.
A narrow focus on cohorts around the 1973 RoSLA is justified by the pattern of increasing attainment of academic qualifications in the cohorts born since the 1970s. As it becomes more common for the majority of individuals to attain at least some academic qualifications, the power of the ELR to identify the return to qualifications diminishes -if all in a cohort gain qualifications then this identification strategy will fail. Moreover, as the group of individuals whose behaviour may be influenced by the ELR falls in size the estimated LATE is driven by an ever narrower and specific stratum of those with very little taste for education. Similarly, the further we move away in time from the 1973 RoSLA the more problematic it is to compare the post-RoSLA cohorts to those born before who were able to leave at 15 -the implicit regression discontinuity design weakening with each year that we move away.
More formally, we are interested in estimating the effect of qualifications on labour market outcomes,
where Y it is labour market outcome for individual i at time t (we look at employment, participation and wages), Q i is an indicator for whether the individual has any academic qualifications and X it is a vector of control variables, including age within year, year of birth (dummies), a quadratic in age, plus region and survey quarter*year dummies.
OLS estimates of β are likely to suffer from endogeneity bias. Both the 1973 RoSLA that increased the school leaving age from 15 to 16 and the ELR (post-RoSLA) are potential instruments since they affect the probability of obtaining any academic qualifications. We would argue that the impact of the ELR on outcomes comes solely through the effect on qualifications since the approximate 30 day difference in schooling for those either side of the 31 st January discontinuity is too small to have an impact. This will therefore provide an unbiased estimate of the effect of qualifications. However, the RoSLA also affected the length of schooling by up to one year for affected cohorts and, if this has a separate effect on labour market outcomes, means the estimate of the effect of qualification will be subject to upward bias. Comparing estimates obtained using these two instruments can therefore tell us something about the size of the bias caused by the length of schooling effect, and the relative importance of qualifications and length of schooling on labour market outcomes.
In brief, therefore, our strategy is to obtain -and compare -estimates of β using RoSLA and ELR as instruments. We would expect that β RoSLA ≥ β ELR since RoSLA affected both the probability of gaining qualifications and the length of schooling. If β RoSLA = β ELR this implies that the effect of RoSLA is driven solely by qualifications (there is no upward bias caused by the increase in length of schooling);
if β RoSLA > β ELR then the length of schooling additionally matters as well as qualifications.
One assumption here is that the estimates are comparable. In practice, both are local average treatment effects for those who were induced by the institutional rule to gain qualifications (the "compliers").
For the RoSLA, compliers are people who gain qualifications because they are required to stay on in school from 15 to 16. In the case of the ELR, compliers are people who gain qualifications because they are required to stay on in school from Easter until the end of May. We make an implicit assumption that the effect of gaining qualifications on outcomes is similar for the two groups in order to be able to say anything concrete about what drives the RoSLA effect. This seems reasonable given that both groups of compliers are within the same cohort and are people induced by institutional rules to obtain academic qualifications. Because both estimates are local average treatment effects, they may not be informative of the average treatment effect of academic qualifications. However, the groups of individuals at the margin of gaining any academic qualifications are important from a policy perspective -especially given plans to raise the school leaving age to 17 in 2013 and up to 18 in 2015. 5 We deflate wages using the quarterly RPI 1993Q1=1 and trim the wage distribution to exclude the lowest and highest 2% of the hourly wage distribution; we first remove the lowest and highest 2% of the hours distribution.
Data and descriptives
. To keep samples consistent we use only information from an individual's first interview in all of the results presented.
For the wage effects analysis we include full-time employees only and exclude the self-employed.
When looking at the probability of employment we again exclude the self-employed but do allow part-time employees in the employed category; the unemployed category captures both the registered unemployed and the economically inactive. For the case where participation is the dependent variable, we allow the self-employed and unemployed to be included as participating, the non-participating group comprising solely the economically inactive. In all cases we only include information from individuals who have completed the survey themselves, excluding all proxy respondents.
To avoid any issues in modelling female labour market participation, we restrict our analysis to men.
We focus on cohorts born ten years before and after the RoSLA - Figure 1 illustrates the effect of RoSLA on attainment of different qualification levels using the National Vocational Qualification equivalence scale (see Appendix Table 1 ). This is shown for the full sample (rather than just the estimation sample of those leaving school at 16 or before) allowing us to explore whether RoSLA had any effect on later school leavers. The proportion attaining no ) means that we have variation in age by cohort (and multiple cohorts at the same age). Moreover, though we only retain each individual's first observation, the rolling panel nature of the QLFS means that we have variation in ages and cohorts at each quarter*year of the survey, allowing quarter*year time effects to also be identified. 6 We also exclude men who moved to the UK after their secondary schooling would have begun (i.e. after age 11). 7 We have confirmed all of the main results with the full sample, available from the authors on request. 8 In 2010 we only have data available from the first two quarters. Figure 4 illustrates this further comparing just those born in January and those born in February. This is the discrete jump in qualifications probability that will drive the identification in our estimates using the Easter Leaving Rule. We control in all specifications for the smooth effects of relative age within cohort, using a linear trend; the jump around the 31 st January discontinuity point, post-RoSLA, provides exogenous variation in qualifications attainment. The figure shows clearly the greater attainment for the February born in the post-RoSLA period, a much clearer pattern than in the preRoSLA cohorts. Moreover we see again the up-shift in qualification attainment across the board for the cohorts affected by the RoSLA. Table 2 quantifies the effects of both rules on the probability of attaining academic qualifications in each of the three samples corresponding to the employment outcomes we look at (log wages, employment, participation) using simple linear probability models. "Late leaver" is an indicator that Panel (b) includes all individuals born within each cohort; this is the sample used in the IV regressions. For each sample the effect of RoSLA is to raise the probability of attaining qualifications by around 25 percentage points and for each sample there is a significant effect of the ELR of between 2 and 4 percentage points in the post-RoSLA period -exactly as we would expect. However, in the employment and participation analysis, there is also a significant positive effect of the ELR -of approximately 2 percentage points -on qualifications in the pre-RoSLA period. This is puzzling, as those not eligible to leave at Easter would have to remain for an entire further year before they reached the age at which nationally recognised academic qualification exams are taken. This has previously been found to be a feature of the LFS (see Del Bono and Galindo-Rueda, 2006) , and may be due to mis-reporting of qualifications in the LFS. Individuals who remained until the end of the Summer term pre-RoSLA but left at 15 will in some cases have received a "School Leaving
Regression results
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Certificate" and it may be that some individuals who left at 15 in the pre-RoSLA period report having CSE equivalent level qualifications (and therefore would count as having academic qualifications) in error. Mis-reporting of education is known to be a problem in the LFS, see Thomson et al (2010) and references therein. By excluding all proxy respondents we hoped to limit this problem however it does still remain to some extent. Further analysis (nor reported) provided some support for this mis-.
The results in Table 2 confirm the evidence from Figures 3 and 4 on the effect of the ELR. The more closely focused around the 31 st January cut-off point the sample is, the more credible the assumption that individuals differ only in their qualification attainment due to the ELR. Panel (a) of Table 2 considers only January and February-born individuals and, for the larger employment and participation samples, the ELR has a significant effect in increasing the probability of attaining academic qualifications by around 7 percentage points in the post-RoSLA period, but no effect in the pre-RoSLA period. For the smaller wage sample, there is no ELR effect either pre-or post-RoSLA. In all samples, there is a sizeable effect of RoSLA itself, raising the probability of attaining qualifications by between 22 and 27 percentage points. These regression results confirm that both the RoSLA and the ELR are potentially relevant instruments for academic qualifications, although these regressions do not include any other covariates.
reporting explanation -reduced-form estimates showed that while the ELR may have an effect on qualification attainment pre-RoSLA, this does not translate into any effects in the labour market which is consistent with CSE level qualifications having been erroneously recorded.
IV estimates using RoSLA and ELR
As discussed in section 3, the main aim of this paper is to shed light on whether the effect of RoSLA is driven by the increase in qualifications or by the increase in the length of schooling. We do this by estimating an unbiased effect of qualifications using ELR as an instrument and comparing this with the potentially (upward) biased estimate of the effect of qualifications (if length of schooling also matters) using RoSLA. Table 3 pursues this idea, presenting IV estimates of the effect of qualifications using each instrument separately.
10
When including all other covariates, the instruments used separately are too weak to identify the causal effects of academic qualifications on log wage in the sample available. Neither RoSLA nor ELR is statistically significant in the first stage regression. Grenet (2009) uses a larger sample from the LFS and does find a reduced form effect of the 1973 RoSLA on later log wages of 1.6% to 2.1% -which is similar to the point estimate in our sample, not reported -but statistically significant in his larger sample.
In order to limit the issues surrounding the potential mis-reporting of qualifications in the pre-RoSLA period, we restrict the estimates using the Easter Leaving Rule to the first 10 cohorts affected by RoSLA.
11
10 The reduced form, Wald estimates, might have been a more obvious point of departure. However, none of the Intention to Treat estimates of employment effects using the ELR was statistically significant; we therefore move straight to presenting the IV results.
11 Grenet uses LFS data from 1993 and cohorts born between 1949 and 1967 ; his sample includes individuals who leave at 18 or younger (ours is 16 or younger) and we are constrained to include only individuals for whom highest qualification is recorded which further reduces our sample relative to Grenet's.
Del Bono and Galindo-Rueda (2006) also fail to find a statistically significant effect of ELR using a larger sample of post-RoSLA cohorts (from September 1957 to August 1975 ; in our smaller sample it is therefore perhaps not surprising that we do not identify an effect on log wages.
We therefore focus on the results for employment and participation.
In the larger samples for employment and participation, each instrument is sufficiently strong to generate statistically significant variation in academic qualification attainment, allowing more precise IV estimates of the causal effect of qualifications on employment and participation. In each specification the first stage F-statistic on the exclusion of the instrument exceeds the rule-of-thumb value of 10 for non-weak instruments.
RoSLA is estimated to increase the probability of attaining academic qualifications by 9.4 percentage points (employment analysis sample) and 8.5 pp (participation analysis) in each case significant at the 1% level. The RoSLA IV estimate of the effect of qualifications on employment is an increase of 55.8
percentage points (significant at the 5% level). This is a large effect, more than double the OLS estimate of 24.3 pp. The story is similar for participation: the RoSLA IV estimate is that academic qualifications increase the probability of participating in the labour market by 45.0 pp. This is approximately three times greater than the OLS estimate of 15.2pp. One possible explanation for the larger IV estimates is that they capture a LATE for those who only gained qualifications because of the constraint of RoSLA. They may also be upward-biased estimates of the true effect of qualifications because of the increase in years' schooling which may separately have affected employment and participation.
The estimates on the right hand side of Table 3 provide some evidence on the extent to which qualifications, rather than the extra year in education, account for the RoSLA returns. In these estimates, we identify the effect of qualifications using the ELR (and only the post-RoSLA cohorts).
We argue that this provides unbiased estimates of the effects of qualifications because the ELR had a negligible effect on years' schooling received. The first stage estimates indicate that being a late leaver increases the probability of attaining academic qualifications by 5.9 pp in the employment analysis sample and 6.6 pp in the participation sample (both significant at the 1% level). For employment, the IV estimated return to academic qualifications is a 39.7 pp increase in employment probability, compared to the OLS estimate of 27.0 pp. For participation, the ELR estimated IV return is 26.0 pp compared with the OLS estimate of 15.2 pp. These results are similar to Del Bono and Galindo-Rueda (2006) .
The comparison of note is between the IV estimates using RoSLA and the IV estimates using ELR.
For both employment and participation, instrumenting qualifications using RoSLA yields larger estimates. This is consistent with there being some upward bias because of an additional effect on years' of schooling. However, the difference between these estimates and the IV estimates using ELR is not large -particularly for employment. The estimate based on the ELR is more than 70% of the estimated based on RoSLA, suggesting that most of the return associated with RoSLA is being driven by the return to academic qualifications, rather than the additional year of education. This goes some way to answering whether it is time in school or credentials that matter most for the cohorts affected by RoSLA.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have used one institutional rule -the Easter Leaving Rule (ELR) -to shed light on what drives the effect on employment outcomes of another institutional rule -the 1973 RoSLA from 15 to 16. This reform had two effects on educational outcomes that could impact employment: it both increased the length of time that children spent in school by up to one year and made it more likely that they would leave school with some academic qualifications since the relevant exams are taken at age 16 in the UK. Using RoSLA to instrument years' schooling (as has been done in previous studies)
is therefore likely to produce biased estimates of the returns to years' schooling in the purest sense because of this qualification effect.
The ELR defined exactly when children could leave school -at Easter (children born between 1 st September -31 st January) or at the end of the summer term (children born between 1 st February -31 st August). We show that for post-RoSLA cohorts, late leavers were significantly more likely to obtain academic qualifications since they were forced to stay until the end of the exam-taking term. We exploit this discontinuity to obtain an unbiased estimate of the effect of qualifications on later employment outcomes, focusing on employment and participation. Consistent with previous studies (Dearden, 1999 , Blundell et al, 2005 and Del Bono and Galindo-Rueda, 2006 , we find that qualifications have a large, positive effect on later outcomes, increasing the probability of employment by 40 percentage points, although this must be caveated that it is a local average treatment effect for those who were induced by the ELR to obtain academic qualifications.
Comparing the estimates of the returns to qualifications (on employment and participation) using the ELR as an instrument with the estimates using the RoSLA as an instrument, we show that most of the returns to RoSLA appear to be driven by qualifications, but that there is some (small) additional return to increasing the length of schooling.
Our findings have several implications. First, they help to reconcile previous estimates of the returns to education associated with the 1947 RoSLA, which raised the leaving age from 14 to 15, and the 1973 RoSLA, which raised the leaving age from 15 to 16. Estimates of the former (Devereux and Hart, 2010) are smaller than the latter (Grenet, 2009 ): a 3-4 per cent boost in earnings, compared to a 6-8 per cent. Grenet had previously suggested that the fact that the 1973 reform saw a sizeable increase in the proportion leaving with academic qualifications may account for this difference; we provide direct evidence to support this claim. Importantly, this does mean that the two reforms should be kept separate in obtaining estimates of the returns to education since their effects on educational outcomes were different.
Secondly, our results strongly suggest that qualifications drive much of the estimated returns to raising the school leaving age from 15 to 16. This is potentially relevant to current UK government policy which is to raise the school leaving age again from 16 to 17 in 2013. The second set of high stakes exams is typically not taken until age 18; there is therefore a potential concern that simply increasing the length of time that pupils spend in education without a corresponding increase in qualifications would have substantially less of an effect than if pupils both gained an extra year and left with some credentials. Another consideration is that requiring pupils to spend another year in fulltime education is costly in terms of resources; by comparison, requiring them to take exams and increasing the probability of leaving with qualifications could be a more cost-effective approach. 
